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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
COMMERCIAL PAPER AND BANK DEPOSITS
AND COLLECTIONS
Ronald L. Hersbergen*
ITEMS IN THE BANK COLLECTION PROCESS
Under the Commercial Laws' a forgery 2 of a necessary indorsement3
on a check which has been deposited for collection typically gives rise to
litigation between the various parties premised upon several possible
theories of recovery. One such theory of recovery arises when the check is
finally paid4 by the drawee-payor bank. In such a case, the drawee is
liable5 to owner of the check.6 The depositary bank7 is similarly liable to
the true owner, but the latter cannot recover against both a depositary bank
and the drawee-payor bank. 8 Should the drawee bank be liable under
section 3-419(l), 9 it will automatically have a right to recover from the
depositary bank under the implied warranties made by the depositary bank
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
I. LA. R.S. 10:1-101 through 5-117 (Supp. 1974). Section 1-101 provides that
title 10 of the Revised Statutes shall be known as the "Commercial Laws." These
provisions represent the enactment of articles 3, 4 and 5 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.), with minor revisions where necessary to conform with the general
scheme of Louisiana law. Hereinafter, any reference to the U.C.C., where different
from Louisiana law, will be noted. Otherwise, any reference to "Commercial
Laws" will be to title 10.
2. A forgery is simply an "unauthorized" signature. LA. R.S. 10:1-201 (Supp.
1974).
3. In this context an indorsement is "necessary" when its absence would
prevent a proper "negotiation" of the instrument. See id. 10:1-201 (definition of
"holder"), 3-202(1) (Supp. 1974). The legal consequences are generally the same
whether the signature is forged or simply made without authority.
4. See id. 10:4-213 (Supp. 1974).
5. Id. 10:3-419(1) (Supp. 1974): "[W]hen a person pays an instrument on a
forged indorsement, he is liable to the true owner." The language is adopted from
U.C.C. section 3-419(l)(c), which states the principle of liability in terms of
common law "conversion." See U.C.C. § 3-419, comments 1-3.
6. Presumably the party whose signature is forged is the true owner.
7. LA. R.S. 10:4-105(a) (Supp. 1974).
8. See Cooper v. Union Bank, 9 Cal. 3d 123, 507 P.2d 609, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1973).
9. LA. R.S. 10:3419(1) (Supp. 1974). Liability is not automatic, because the
forgery, as an unauthorized signature, may not always be assertable by the true
owner. See LA. R.S. 10:3-404, 3-405, 3-406 (Supp. 1974).
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pursuant to section 4-207(1); the depositary bank has a like warranty
action against its customer'°-the depositor of the check-under section
4-207(2). The depositor and each prior transferor of the check have a
similar warranty right against their respective transferors under section 3-
417(2); ultimately, however, the party who dealt with the forger will most
likely bear the loss.'1
Alternatively, the true owner may forego his right to sue either the
drawee bank which paid the check or the depositary bank and proceed
instead against the party with whom he dealt, upon the theory that the
check was taken as conditional payment only, and that since the true
owner has not received payment from the proceeds of the check, the
underlying obligation remains outstanding and unpaid. ' 2 Such an action
would typically involve the drawer and the payee, and because discharge
by payment' 3 is the only logical defense to the payee's suit, the drawer can
be compelled to pay the underlying obligation. The drawer is not preju-
diced by the true owner's election of this second theory of recovery since
he thereby has a right to have his account recredited by drawee upon a
theory of breach of the checking account contract. 14 Should the drawer be
successful in his action,' 5 the drawee bank would once again be entitled to
a recovery for breach of the depositary bank's section 4-207(1) warranty,
and again, the loss typically would fall upon the party who, having dealt
with the forger, has no effective warranty protection.
10. Id. 10:4-104(l)(e) (Supp. 1974).
11. See Twellman v. Lindell Trust Co., 534 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976);
Bank of the West v. Wes-Con Dev. Co., 15 Wash. App. 238, 548 P.2d 563 (Ct. App.
1976). The warranties of good title, like the other warranties under section 3-417(2),
arise upon a transfer, not an indorsement, of the instrument. Therefore, the true
owner who, in his action under section 3-419(1), might be precluded by section 3-
406 from asserting that his name was forged, arguably does not face the preclusion
problem when he is sued on a warranty theory, since sections 3-404 and 3-406 are
addressed only to the unauthorized signature situation. But see Allied Concord Fin.
Corp. v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 80 Cal. Rptr. 622 (Cal. App.
1969). Of course, general principles of equitable estoppel, which are brought into
the Commercial Laws by section 1-103, could preclude the true owner from denying
that he transferred (and therefore warranted) the instrument.
12. See, e.g., Seliga v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 174 So. 2d 878 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1965); Pirkle & Williams v. Shreveport Jitney Jungle, Inc., 140 So. 837 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1932).
13. LA. R.S. 10:3-601(l)(a) (Supp. 1974).
14. Id. 10:4-401(1) (Supp. 1974). The "properly payable" status of checks is
discussed in Hersbergen, The Bank-Customer Relationship Under the Louisiana
Commercial Laws, 36 LA. L. REV. 29 (1975).
15. Drawer's action can be precluded under LA. R.S. 10:4-406 (Supp. 1974).
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If it should happen that the true owner's notification of loss or the
demand for payment of the underlying obligation reaches the drawer at a
time when he can still order the drawee to stop payment 6 on the check, the
check will be returned as an unpaid item to the depositary bank. In that
event, the drawer's account will not be affected, and the drawee bank, not
having paid the item, will not be subject to a suit by the true owner under
section 3-419(1). Upon receipt of the returned check, the depositary bank
will then have either the right of a "holder" to sue the drawer or prior
indorsers,' 7 or the right to sue the depositor (its customer) under the
section 4-207(2) engagement of the latter.' 8 The depositor has a similar
right against unqualified indorsers prior to him, pursuant to section 3-
414(1), and once again the loss is shifted back up the chain of indorsers' 9
until it reaches the party who dealt with the forger.
The above described scheme of distributing the inevitable losses due
to forgery is new to Louisiana law.20 Many of the same liability issues
arise in situations which involve neither a forged indorsement nor an ill-
intentioned party. Such was the case in Davis v. Miller Builders &
Developers, Inc.2 The plaintiff, an attorney, had disbursed the proceeds
of a house sale by issuing checks to various payees. One such check was
made payable to Miller Builders, and another was made payable to
Louisiana Bank & Trust Company ("LB&T"). By oversight, plaintiff's
16. See id. 10:4-403. Cf. id. 10:4-407.
17. Given that the item bears a forged indorsement (or, more precisely, that it
lacks a necessary indorsement) the depositary bank cannot technically be a
"holder." See note 3, supra. By utilizing LA. R.S. 10:3-406, however, the bank
may be able to preclude the true owner from asserting the inoperativeness of his
signature, thereby permitting the bank's allegation that it is in fact the holder to go
unchallenged. Where the depositary bank sues the drawer, the bank's lack of holder
status usually can be raised-the drawer having done nothing that would preclude
him from doing so-and the bank's lack of holder status becomes, in effect, a
defense to payment by drawer. See U.C.C. §§ 3-413(2), 3-603(1).
18. Under section 4-207(2) the depositor-customer not only warrants title and
other matters to the depositary bank, he also engages that upon dishonor and notice
of dishonor he will "take up" the item. Cf. LA. R.S. 30:3-414 (Supp. 1974).
19. Under LA. R.S. 10:3-414, any of the indorsers in the chain could, of course,
have limited his undertaking to mere transfer of title by a qualified indorsement,
such as "without recourse," but an unqualified indorser's engagement under sec-
tion 3-414 runs to "the holder or to any subsequent indorser who takes it [the
instrument] up."
20. Compare Smith v. Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 272 So. 2d 678 (La. 1973);
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Commercial
Paper, 34 LA. L. REV. 293 (1974).
21. 340 So. 2d 409 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
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employee listed both checks on a deposit slip, and deposited them for
collection in an account in Miller's name in Commercial National Bank
("Commercial"), writing on the back of each check "for deposit to
account of [Miller]." Commercial, failing to observe that the LB&T
check was not properly indorsed,22 credited both checks to Miller's ac-
count, affixed to both its "all prior endorsements guaranteed" stamp, and
forwarded the checks for payment to the drawee bank, Pioneer Bank &
Trust Co. ("Pioneer"), which bank honored both checks and debited
plaintiff's account. The mistake was discovered when LB&T foreclosed a
mortgage which should have been paid off by plaintiff's check to LB&T.
Miller was unable to make restitution of the proceeds of the LB&T check,
and litigation followed.
The Second Circuit, applying pre-Commercial Law principles, held
(1) that plaintiff was entitled to judgment against Pioneer, since the latter
paid an item that was not properly payable, due to the lack of the payee's
indorsement;23 (2) that Commercial was liable to Pioneer on its guaranty
of all prior indorsements; 24 (3) with respect to Commercial's negligence
action against plaintiff, the court found no liability, in that Commercial
itself should have sought clarification of the obvious inconsistency be-
tween the check and the deposit slip. Judgment was also granted Commer-
cial against its depositor, Miller. Under the Commercial Laws, the court's
ruling with respect to the plaintiff-drawer versus the drawee bank would
without doubt be the same.25 The liabilities between drawee-payor bank
and the depositary-collecting bank, and between the latter bank and
drawer, would probably be the same under the Commercial Laws as well
though the methodology is different.
Under the Commercial Laws, the warranty of section 4-207(1)(a)
replaces and renders unnecessary the "PEG" stamp. 26 Therefore, if the
22. The check made payable to Miller was not indorsed by Miller, but this
matter was not at issue since it ultimately was paid to Miller as intended. Cf. LA.
R.S. 10:4-205(1) (Supp. 1974).
23. The drawer's order to drawee was to pay Louisiana Bank and Trust or its
order. Without LB&T's indorsement, Pioneer accomplished neither result. The
ruling would be the same under LA. R.S. 10:4-401 (Supp. 1974) and U.C.C. section
4-406 imposes no duty whatsoever on a drawer to discover a missing indorsement.
24. Under the applicable local clearinghouse agreement, Commercial's "PEG"
stamp guaranteed prior indorsements even though the first indorsement was miss-
ing. LA. R.S. 10:4-207(1) (Supp. 1974) accomplishes this result anyway. See note 26,
infra.
25. See LA. R.S. 10:4-401(1) (Supp. 1974).
26. See id. 10:4-207(3) (Supp. 1974), and U.C.C. comment 2 thereto. The
warranties of section 4-207(1) apply to a missing, as well as a forged, indorsement.
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same case were to arise today, the liability of Commercial to Pioneer
would be a matter of breach of the section 4-207(l)(a) warranty by
Commercial that it either had a good title to the item, or was authorized to
obtain payment on behalf of one who did have good title. 27 Seemingly the
warranty would be breached, in that Commercial could not itself have had
title without LB&T's indorsement (or a right to supply it, had LB&T been
a "customer" of Commercial),28 and Commercial arguably was not au-
thorized to obtain payment by one who had title. 29 But liability is not
automatic; in addition to the question whether Commercial did in fact
represent a party who had title, there is the requirement of section 4-207(4)
that the claim for breach of warranty be made within a reasonable time
after the claimant learns of the breach. Because the erroneously credited
account is continuously being depleted, and the account holder in question
is sometimes unable to respond financially in such cases, dilatory action
by the warrantee under subsection (4) can result in a discharge of the
warrantor to a large portion of the warranty claim.
Despite the presence of new potential pitfalls, the payor bank/collect-
ing bank litigation would most likely be decided the same today as it was
in Davis. Perhaps the collecting bank-drawer aspect of that case would
also have the same result today. In effect, the Second Circuit found that
both the drawer and the collecting bank were negligent, 30 and the "tie"
went to the drawer. 3 But the pre-Commercial Laws legal principles did
See Feldman Const. Co. v. Union Bank, 28 Cal. App. 3d 731,104 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Ct.
App. 1972).
27. See American Nat'l Bank v. Foodbasket, 493 P.2d 403 (Wyo. 1972) ("title"
equated with marketability).
28. See LA. R.S. 10:4-104(l)(e) (Supp. 1974).
29. Lacking a delivery to it, Louisiana Bank and Trust would not have had title,
and logically, the drawer himself cannot be said to have had title; the latter point is
not without some confusion, however. Compare Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp. v.
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d 358 (1962) and Jett v. Lewis
State Bank, 277 So. 2d 37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), with Prudential Ins. Co. of
America v. Marine Nat'l Exch. Bank, 315 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Wis. 1970) and
International Indus., Inc. v. Island State Bank, 348 F. Supp. 886 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
The indicated cases do not directly involve the drawer's title to a non-delivered
instrument as a warranty issue; rather, the issue in those cases was whether the
drawer could be called a "true owner" for purposes of an action under U.C.C.
section 3-419(1).
30. 340 So. 2d at 413. The burden is upon the depositary bank to make sure that
indorsements are valid. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v, Marine Nat'l Bank, 303
F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Fla. 1969), aff'd, 431 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1970); Birmingham
Trust Nat'l Bank v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 49 Ala. App. 630, 275 So. 2d 148
(Ala. Civ. App.), writ denied, 275 So. 2d 153 (Ala. 1973).
31. Cf. LA. R.S. 10:3-406, 4-406(2)-(3) (Supp. 1974).
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not recognize the warranties now implied by section 4-207(2). Though the
drawer in Davis did not transfer title to the LB&T check to Commercial, it
did "transfer" for collection purposes, 32 and it would follow that the
drawer made the same warranty to Commercial that Commercial as a
collecting bank made to Pioneer 33-if the drawer was a "customer" who
received a settlement. Drawer arguably was a customer, but it is equally
arguable that he received no "settlement or other consideration" within
the meaning of subsection (2). Accordingly, the drawer in Davis would
have made no warranty under section 4-207(2). 34
A final theory exists by virtue of the enactment of the Commercial
Laws under which a court could hold favorably for a collecting bank
against a drawer. The theory arose in Cooper v. Union Bank,35 a decision
of the California Supreme Court in which the identical U.C.C. section 3-
404 was held to include equitable estoppel, invocable against a payee to
avoid an unconscionable result. 36 Because the California court could just
32. 340 So. 2d at 413.
33. The warranty is one of good title in either instance; Commercial's warranty
arises under section 4-207(1), while drawer's warranty-if any-arises under sec-
tion 4-207(2).
34. Miller certainly was a "customer" within the meaning of LA. R.S. 10:4-
104(1)(3), in that he had an account with Commercial, but section 4-104 is prefaced
by an "unless the context otherwise requires" clause. Within the context of section
4-207(2) the term probably refers more precisely to a person "for whom the bank
has agreed to collect items," i.e., the depositor. Miller was not the depositor-the
drawer was, and the drawer received no "consideration." If plaintiff was acting for
Miller in a representative capacity, then Miller made a warranty under section 4-
207(2), but if plaintiff had no authority to act for Miller, he must be said to have
acted for himself personally, and perhaps would have made a warranty not as a
"customer" of Commercial but as a person for whom the bank agreed to collect the
item.
A very reliable, but not failsafe, method of determining the warranty liability of
a depositor is to determine whether he would have been liable on his signature had
the item been returned to the depositary bank as a dishonored item. Had that
occurred in Davis, and had the Commercial Laws applied, Davis probably would
not have been liable as a drawer in an action by Commercial, since Commercial's
failure to observe reasonable commercial standards (i.e., overlooking the discre-
pancy between the deposit slip and the check) makes unavailable to it the means of
precluding Davis from raising the one fatal flaw in Commercial's suit: without
Louisiana Bank and Trust's indorsement, Commercial cannot be the "holder," and
that being so, it is questionable whether a non-holder can maintain an action on the
instrument. It is highly questionable whether the drawer's engagement runs to a
non-holder, the payment to whom would not discharge the drawer. See U.C.C. §§
3-406, 3-413(2), 3-603; cf. id. § 3-301.
35. 9 Cal. 3d 371, 507 P.2d 609, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973).
36. The court relied on the fact that section 23 of the Negotiable Instrument
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as readily have applied an estoppel-to-avoid-unconscionability theory
under U.C.C. section 1-103, 3 7 a Louisiana court could rule similarly
against the drawer in a non-forgery case such as Davis. While Louisiana
expressly recognizes "equitable estoppel, '-3 8 and implicitly recognizes
unconscionability as a grounds for avoidance of an obligation, 39 so that
these theories can be applied through section 1-103, the Cooper case is
readily distinguishable.'
THE BANK-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP
Because the banking world is increasingly one of sophisticated ma-
chine technology, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Hibernia National Bank
in New Orleans v. Lee4 is almost reassuring in that its facts disclose a
banking error of the human variety. The decision itself, however, is
unfortunate. A review of the facts of the Lee decision readily discloses
that undue criticism of the majority opinion would be unfair; rather, the
opinion simply missed the opportunity to eliminate, by a policy ruling, a
bank-customer problem of possibly frequent occurrence. Plaintiff had a
car loan at Hibernia on which monthly installment payments were owed.
She opened a checking account with the bank, signing a signature card
containing a provision which empowered Hibernia to charge against her
Law had been similarly construed. See id. at 383-84 & n.17, 507 P.2d at 618-19 &
n.17, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 10-11 & n.17.
37. LA. R.S. 10:1-103 (Supp. 1974) states the same principle as U.C.C. section
1-103, omitting common law terms found in the U.C.C. section.
38. See, e.g., American Bank & Trust Co. v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 251
La. 445, 205 So. 2d 35 (1967); Babin v. Montegut Ins. Agency, Inc., 271 So. 2d 642
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1972); Calhoun v. Huffman, 217 So. 2d 733 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
writ refused, 253 La. 878, 220 So. 2d 460 (La. 1969).
39. See, e.g., Smith v. Everett, 291 So. 2d 835 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974), writ
denied, 294 So. 2d 827 (La. 1974); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Henry, 221 So. 2d 529
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1969); Broussard v. Fidelity Standard Life Ins. Co., 146 So. 2d
292 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962); Housecraft Div. of Southern Siding Co. v. Tatum, 130
So. 2d 524 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961). Cf. Marcello v. Bussiere, 284 So. 2d 892 (La.
1973); Prince v. Paretti Pontiac Co., 281 So. 2d 112 (La. 1973) (regarding disclaimer
of warranty).
40. Cooper involved a series of forgeries of the same payee's name by payee's
own employee. Payee's suit against various collecting banks was precluded by
rather strong evidence of negligence, including the hiring of a known, and not-
necessarily reformed gambler, whose activities went unsupervised. A significant
difference exists between the handling of a forged indorsement and that of a
missing indorsement. In the former case, the collecting bank may or may not itself
be negligent; but handling a check which has no indorsement at all casts the bank
into an almost indefensible position.
41. 344 So. 2d 16 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
[Vol. 38
WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1976-1977
account "any liabilities whatsoever" that she might owe the bank.42 By
plaintiff's version of the relevant events, on January 2, 1976, she pre-
sented to Hibernia's drive-up window teller two checks totaling $310.74,
and a deposit slip for $175, receiving about $40 in cash, making a loan
payment and depositing the remainder. The teller's version of the transac-
tion was that plaintiff deposited $175, and received $135.74 in cash-
making no loan payment. The key to the controversy is that one of these
two checks was made payable to the order of Hibernia Bank in the amount
of $110.27, with the annotation "For # 11-016596." The sum of $110.27
just happened to be the exact amount of her loan installment. Since she did
not notice the reference to the loan note number, 43 and since plaintiff
presented no loan payment coupon therewith, defendant's teller treated the
check as an item for cash, stamping it "cashed." The tape from her
machine substantiated the teller's version of the transaction.
When no payment" on the loan was disclosed by Hibernia's records
as of February 5, 1976, the bank filed suit on the note and seized
plaintiff's car. On February 27, 1976 the bank "froze" plaintiff's check-
ing account balance of $686.08, pursuant to the signature card agreement,
causing subsequent dishonoring of plaintiff's checks. The majority opin-
ion affirmed the lower courts dismissal of plaintiff's claim for wrongful
dishonor. 4
5
Purely from the standpoint of wrongful dishonor, the Lee case
presents two issues: 1) did plaintiff in fact make a payment on her loan (if
so, the dishonors were wrongful); 2) was Hibernia entitled to "freeze"
plaintiff's checking account, even if plaintiff made no payment on her
loan? The lower court, and the Fourth Circuit, resolved the payment
dispute against the plaintiff-a conclusion which finds some support in the
42. In Louisiana a bank has no right, independent of an express agreement to
that effect, to apply deposited funds to the debts of the depositor. See, e.g., S.E.C.
v. Affiliated Inv. Corp., 298 F. Supp. 178 (W.D. La. 1968), aff'd, 409 F.2d 570 (5th
Cir. 1969); Thomas v. Marine Bank & Trust Co., 156 La. 941, 101 So. 315 (1924);
Murdock & Williams v. Citizens' Bank, 23 La. Ann. 113 (1871).
43. The check also referenced "Consumer Credit."
44. On January 2, 1976, plaintiff owed payments for the months of November,
December, and January. Plaintiff drew a check to Hibernia on January 30, 1976 for
$220.54, to cover two months' payments.
45. In addition to a claim for wrongful dishonor, plaintiff alleged that defendant
failed to afford her procedural due process under the fourteenth amendment. The
Fourth Circuit found no "state action" in the bank's exercise of its contractual right
of setoff. Cf. Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 496 F.2d 927 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1001 (1974).
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evidence.' 6 Still, if it be assumed that plaintiff's attempted payment was
ineffective, the key issue-raised by Judge Redmann in his dissenting
opinion-must be faced: Did Hibernia, which unquestionably could have
charged the delinquent note payment against plaintiff's checking account
at any time during November, December, January and February,47 have
any right to prevent by a "freeze" on February 27th the honoring of
checks drawn on that account? The answer must be "no!" The right to
"charge" against the account any liabilities owed the bank does not
include the right to direct that no further items be honored against the
account.48 In fact, the bank's freeze was no doubt just what Judge Red-
mann called it-an invalid and unlawful pledge. The resulting dishonors
of plaintiff's checks were therefore wrongful under section 4-402.
MARGINAL NOTATIONS
The Commercial Laws contain no express treatment of the problem
of marginal notations placed on the face of a negotiable instrument.49 The
marginal notation will be given effect,5" if placed on the instrument at the
46. The bank's machine-generated record of the transaction was no doubt
persuasive on the issue, but the bank's internal labelling of the transaction (as one
of "cash") should not be given undue weight, for it is as self-serving as the
plaintiff's testimony. If, for example, defendant's teller erroneously treated the
$110.27 check as a deposit to plaintiff's checking account, crediting same accord-
ingly, could the court have said that the note payment was not made? The une-
quivocal order of the plaintiff, as embodied in the check, and directed specifically
to Hibernia, was "pay to the order of Hibernia Bank," that is, "pay yourself, for
#11-016596." Payment to any other person would violate that order, and be a
wrongful payment.
In his dissent, Judge Redmann does point out that the failure to resolve this
factual issue against the payee (Hibernia) on policy grounds tends to create the
opportunity for mischief, or at least the opportunity for consumer grief through
honest mistake, by payee creditors who might contend that the check made payable
to them was actually "cashed'," even though the amount of the check was exactly
that owed them by the drawer.
47. It is inferable that plaintiff's account was minimal until the February 27th
"freeze" action. By that time, suit had been filed and the note accelerated. By
"charging" the account, the note may have been made "current," a result the bank
perhaps did not desire at that time.
48. As a matter of the contract between plaintiff and Hibernia, plaintiff's
checks had to be honored so long as they were "properly payable," unless the bank
had by exercise of its right of charge (e.g., LA. R.S. 10:4-401, 4-303 (Supp. 1974)),
made the account insufficient.
49. Should the notation constitute a condition to the undertaking of the obligor,
the instrument may be rendered non-negotiable. See Southern Baptist Hosp. v.
Williams, 89 So. 2d 769 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1956).
50. See, e.g., Greiner v. Rogers, 450 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969); Fleming
v. Becker, 14 Ariz. App. 347, 483 P.2d 579 (1971). Such decisions exemplify the
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time of execution and with the intention that it become a part of the
instrument. A common use of the marginal notation is to effect a compro-
mise5 of a claim by noting on a check, "In full and complete satisfaction
and release of all claims against drawer," or comparable language. But, as
discovered by the defendant in Terra Trucks, Inc. v. Weber,5 2 the margin-
ally noted check must be taken by the creditor-payee as full payment of the
disputed sum; if not, there is no compromise. The defendant in Weber lost
the compromise issue principally because her marginal notation was not
sufficiently descriptive. 5
3
The issue raised in Weber, which is actually related to the broader
legal issue of when a check is taken in payment, 54 rather than as a
conditional offer of payment, is an important one. With the proper lan-
guage, a marginal notation can be an effective means of bringing the
compromise defense into the lawsuit.55 The marginal notation should be
accompanied by a letter to the creditor-payee spelling out in unambiguous
terms the effect of taking the check intended by the drawer to be a tender
in compromise of the obligation.56
For the creditor-payee, receipt of a check properly noted by the
drawer as a tender in compromise of the disputed claim must be handled
carefully. Refusing the check, or refusing to cash it, is a safe but unpalat-
able alternative, and striking out the marginal notation will not avail the
creditor. 57 Section 1-207 of the Commercial Laws may give the creditor-
payee a way to avoid the compromise issue: this section seems to permit
operation of LA. R.S. 10:1-103 (Supp. 1974): "[Ulnless displaced by the particular
provision of this title, the other laws of Louisiana shall apply."
51. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3071-3083.
52. 346 So. 2d 275 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
53. Defendant had contracted for landfill services to be performed by plaintiff,
and was either unhappy with that performance, or with the agreed price of $2,200.
Defendant delivered a check to plaintiff for $1,600 bearing the notation "Fill
Pasadena Lots" on the lower left face of the check. Plaintiff accepted the check.
54. See, e.g., Seliga v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 174 So. 2d 878 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1965); Pirkle & Williams, Inc. v. Shreveport Jitney Jungle, Inc., 140 So. 837
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1932).
55. See A. Ray Curtis Co. v. Barnes, (Utah, 1976) 554 P.2d 212 (Utah 1977)
(drawer placed on the check the notation "endorsement of this check constitutes
payment in full," a tactic which resulted in a common law accord and satisfaction
upon indorsement).
56. See LA. R.S. 10:3-119(1) (Supp. 1974): "As between the obligor and his
immediate obligee . . . the terms of an instrument may be modified or affected by
any other written agreement executed as a part of the same transaction ....




the payee to indorse the marginally noted compromise check "without
prejudice" or "under protest." '58 Two U.C.C. decisions have permitted
creditor-payees to avoid the consequences of the drawer's "in full pay-
ment" notations by reservation of right words in the payee's indorse-
ment.59 If the decisions are correct in their underlying premise that U.C.C.
section 1-207 effects a change in common law theory of accord and
satisfaction,6" it would seem arguable that section 1-207 provides the
Louisiana creditor with a very nice way of avoiding the compromise issue
otherwise created by the check marginally noted "in full payment" or the
like.
58. LA. R.S. 10:1-207 (Supp. 1974) provides that:
A party who with explicii reservation of rights . . . assents to performance in a
manner ...offered by the other party does not thereby prejudice the rights
reserved. Such words as "without prejudice," "under protest" or the like are
sufficient.
59. See Hanna v. Perkins, 2 U.C.C. Rep. 1044 (N.Y. County Ct. 1965); Baillie
Lumber Co. v. Kincaid Carolina Corp., 4 N.C. App. 342, 167 S.E.2d 85 (N.C. App.
1969).
60. For a discussion of the legislative history of U.C.C. section 1-207, U.C.C.
comments thereto, and analysis of the effect of the section on the "accord and
satisfaction issue," see Hawkland, The Effect of U.C.C. § 1-207 on the Doctrine of
Accord and Satisfaction by Conditional Check, 74 COMM. L.J 329 (1969). Profes-
sor Hawkland presents plausible arguments on both sides of the issue. Because
Louisiana's enactment of title 10 was not a complete revision of the commercial
transactions field, as was true in the common law states, it can be argued that LA.
R.S. 10:1-207 (Supp. 1974) applies only to reservation of rights on negotiable
instruments, which a check marginally noted "in full payment" might not be. LA.
R.S. 10:3-104(i)(b) (Supp. 1974). Buttressing this argument is the fact that Louisia-
na did not enact U.C.C. section 3-802 pertaining to the effect of a check on the
underlying obligation (though Louisiana jurisprudence is not contrary thereto), and
the fact that section 1-207 contains no comment by the Law Institute, something
one would perhaps expect if Civil Code article 3071 was to be affected.
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